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Indiana University Press, $29.95 hardcover ISBN 253344735
Diplomatic wrangling
An international perspective
At the time of his death, Frank J. Merli was preparing a multi-volume work
on Confederate sea power, American diplomacy, and British neutrality during
the Civil War. Merli's work had centered on diplomacy, dealing mainly with
Confederate efforts to gain recognition from Britain and France, and on naval
affairs, particularly the Confederate efforts to build a navy abroad. These two
elements of Southern foreign policy found a common focus in the building,
departure from Britain, and the career at sea of the commerce raider, C.S.S.
Alabama. The legal, financial, and diplomatic ruckus raised by the Alabama
claims over the obligations of neutrality and the nature of blockade generated a
welter of diplomacy that roiled on until a general settlement emerged in 1872.
These interconnected naval and diplomatic issues formed the core of Merli's
projected volumes, a few chapters from which have been put into a publishable
form by his friend, and literary executor, David M Fahey. The Merli/Fahey book
is, therefore, a sondage into the immense volume of Merli's lifetime research into
the issues of war, diplomacy, and British neutrality during the Civil War. And
there was a lot to examine and assemble. Merli's style of scholarship was
indefatigable archival research, verifying facts and exposing errors that had crept
into historical writing. In the process of this exhaustive search for sources, Frank
Merli amassed an archive of his own, composed of microfilm, notebooks, and
rare books. The abundance of archival material allowed Merli to write somewhat
disconnected chapters, designed, ultimately, for more than one volume, and
David Fahey has brought together seven of them, centered around the theme of
British response to the demands of neutrality, together into this book.
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Merli's devotion to intense archival research, and his determination to
uncover the exact sequence of events, shows to the best advantage in the three
chapters describing the departure of the Alabama from Merseyide on July 29,
1862. Merli has argued persuasively that an exact chronology of events from
June 23, when minister Charles Francis Adams presented Lord Russell an initial
protest about the mystery ship then building at Liverpool, through July 29 when
the Alabama went to sea, is essential to understanding how the Queen's
government fulfilled its obligations under domestic law and standard
international interpretations of neutrality. Merli has established that chronology,
and, in so doing, has shown that the British government, from Lord Russell as
Foreign Secretary to the custom officials at Liverpool, acted with appropriate
dispatch and due diligence.
Lord Russell took Adams's initial note seriously, and asked for an opinion
from the Law Lords as well as making inquiries within the bureaucracy. Delay is
the nature of bureaucracy, but in the case it was neither undue nor intentional.
Merli has discovered that nearly three of the five weeks between protest and
departure were spent in the American effort to present their evidence and
suspicions in the forms appropriate for British law. When the British officials
finally received depositions that they could accept in form and evaluate in
substance, they moved the paper along promptly, with one exception. The
Queen's Advocate, Sir John Harding, had a nervous breakdown in the summer of
1862, and was unable to do any professional work. The Alabama file lay on his
desk for a week in late July. The illness of Crown law lord, combined with
American delay in presenting their complaint and evidence, gave Confederate
commissioner, Captain James Bulloch, just enough time to get his ship ready. A
little luck, rather than any British conspiracy or incompetence, allowed the
Alabama to sail.
In addition to the absence of British malice or fault in the Alabama's sailing,
Merli also explored an important disagreement amongst British legal authorities
on whether or not building the Alabama violated the English Foreign Enlistment
Act of 1819. The two law lords who were in good health thought, as early as
June 30, that a substantial presumption existed that the ship was being built for
the Confederacy, and it should be detained until the facts could be ascertained.
Solicitors advising customs officials, both in Liverpool and London, had a
different opinion. They did not think there was evidence enough concerning
Confederate destination to justify detaining the Alabama, and their opinion was
sustained a year later when a British jury allowed the Alexandria to sail. The
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customs solicitors had a firm grip on the law, but the law lords, closer to the
center of things, were right on the diplomacy and politics. Ultimately, Lord
Russell took the position of the law lords, and ordered detention. But he was two
days too late. The Alabama had taken supplies and crew on board, and was
sailing for the Azores where she would receive guns.
The career of the Confederate commerce raider Alabama comprised the
maritime equivalent of irregular conflict on land. Guerillas struck suddenly and
unexpectedly, often producing substantial military gain with a small force that
was quite out of proportion to the power expended. Commerce raiding gave the
same result, as a few captures and sinkings raised marine insurance for American
ships to prohibitive levels, driving many from the seas lanes and diverting
American goods to neutral flag ships. In one effort the Confederacy had jumped
the Union blockade and created a blockade of its own, one resting fundamentally
on marine insurance, but not ineffective because it was financial rather than
military. The Confederacy was able to project power beyond a continental war
into the arena of international commerce, and did this with admirable efficiency
in the face of intense and growing American pressure to prevent it.
Although the Confederacy experienced remarkable success in its campaign
against Union commerce, that success had the inherent limitations built into the
nature of irregular conflict. Despite the dislocations caused by the Alabama,
commerce raiding could not sustain the constant military or economic pressure
necessary to retain the advantage gained. Striking at random against Union
commerce could not open an increasingly effective continental blockade and
allow a free flow to Europe. The economic gains were evanescent; the Union
blockade was permanent.
If the Alabama could not affect the outcome of the war, it would poison
Anglo-American diplomatic relations for a decade. Not until the Geneva
Arbitration in 1872 could the career of the Alabama be said to have ended. Not
surprisingly, the legal and diplomatic wrangles lasted far longer than actual
combat. The shadow of war is always greater than the shooting.
The great value of this short book for practicing historians and
knowledgeable readers lies in its painstaking discussion of the Alabama's
departure from Britain. Merli established the facts of the matter, both historically
and legally, and these destroy the legend of a British conspiracy favoring the
Confederacy. The chronology of discussions within the British administration
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and between the British and Americans also indicates the importance of chance
events in history, specifically the illness of the Queen's Advocate. Beyond
establishing a solid chronology for the protest over the Alabama, Merli also
corrects errors that have become part of the standard historiography concerning
the Anglo-American relations during the war. These errors seemed to indicate a
pro-Confederate conspiracy, or at least a strong sympathy for the South, within
the British government, and was incorporated into the standard works of E.D.
Adams, Great Britain and the American Civil War (1925) and Frank L. Owsley,
King Cotton Diplomacy (1931). These magisterial diplomatic histories became
the basic word on British policy, and their mistakes about the facts and the
conclusions drawn therefrom passed into professional orthodoxy. Merli's work,
over the course of time, will set the record straight. It is a significant contribution
to both the profession and the public.
Finally, I must acknowledge a personal connection to the whole subject of
Confederate shipbuilding abroad. My M.A. thesis dealt with Southern efforts to
build ships in France. I worked on this long ago, when the Dodgers still played
in Brooklyn and years were measured by the Julian calendar, but residual interest
in the Confederate navy and trans-Atlantic diplomacy remains. It has been a
great pleasure to renew old acquaintances though this important book.
James D. Hardy, Jr. is a professor of history in the Honors College at
Louisiana State University and has published several books on both history and
literature, including one on baseball.
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